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It has become increasingly popular in recent years 
to investigate the ability of non-human primates to learn 
human languages; the most persistent and successful such 
attempts have involved teaching chimpanzees certain sub-
classes of English. Early studies 1 were unsuccessfully 
devoted to encouraging a rather tempermental infant, Viki, 
to speak the language, but subsequent anatomical inves-
tigations showed that such failures would be the rule: 
the pharyngolaryngeal structures required for human speech 
were found to be absent in Viki and ilk. Taking their 
cue from the methodological limitations disclosed by those 
earlier attempts, the Gardners2 taught their chimpanzee, 
Washoe, American Hand Sign Language, in which she was able 
to "spontaneously" produce several well-formed English 
expressions. Most recently, Premack's^ Sarah has sur-
passed these achievements in a linguistic system in which 
arbitrarily marked plastic pieces stand for words: Sarah 
is reported to have mastered certain rudiments of English 
grammar, to answer and formulate-questions, to distinguish 
use and mention, to properly manipulate quantifiers in a 
wide range of expressions, and to handle certain logical 
operations. What the limits of such performances are is 
regarded at present by most researchers as an open ques-
tion. 
Though all of these investigations are of intrinsic 
interest, their results have been taken to imply conse-
quences of a far wider theoretical scope. Every newly 
reported advance in English competence by non-human pri-
mates has been taken as evidence threatening the thesis 
that humans are programmed from birth with quite specific, 
structured aspects of natural language, among which are 
an active-passive distinction, a transformational grammar, 
linguistic categories such as concrete noun, verb taking 
an abstract subject, and so on. Philosophers, sensing 
dispute in this issue, were not long in contributing 
their own confusions; recently, Professors Margaret 
Atherton and Robert Schwartz^ produced a critical survey 
of these alleged relations between linguistic innateness 
and the use of human language by non-humans. Their view 
of such claims is straightforwardly skeptical: not only 
are extant formulations of connections between linguistic 
species-specificity and innateness false or implausible, 
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they argue, but also every version of the innatist theory 
proper is too metaphorical to render any claim about a 
connection between specificity and innateness intelligible. 
None of the arguments they present in support of these 
criticisms, I wish to argue in this essay, are conclusive 
in the sense they desire: each will be reviewed and in 
turn shown to refine, rather than refute possible connec-
tions between linguistic innateness and specificity. 
The first formula linking linguistic innateness and 
species-specificity that Atherton and Schwartz consider 
holds that competence must be present at birth, for the 
experience of the linguistically competent organism 
radically underdetermines observed performance, and little 
else can be invoked to explain the facts of language 
acquisition. Such a formulation achieves clarity at the 
expense of veracity, Atherton and Schwartz rejoin, for 
surely no humans speak at birth. Moreover, the veracity 
of the formula, they assert, cannot be saved by revising 
it to hold that humans acquire the content of language 
through some process like maturation; for "if it is false 
that humans come into the world equipped with a natural 
language, it is equally plainly false they will develop 
one without a rich experience of a linguistic sort." 
Thus the connection between the linguistic species-
specificity and innatism cannot be cogently articulated 
if such a tie implies that humans are linguistically 
competent at birth.5 
Whatever shortcomings this criticism may possess, it 
must surely be conceded that any theory, whether innatist 
or not, which implied that humans were capable of speech 
at birth would just be silly. But beyond this, it is 
hardly so clear that no account of maturation could 
articulate the desired details of an adequate formulation 
of possible connection between linguistic innateness 
and species-specificity. For Atherton*s and Schwartz's 
view could not appeal to a generally accepted account of 
maturation: we can imagine human skills which do require 
time for maturation, yet clearly possess an innate ele-
ment. Studies on infants have shown, for example, that 
directed grasping for material objects not contiguous 
with the body occurs spontaneously from birth, though 
competence is achieved only through much practice. 
Furthermore, apart from this difficulty, it surely does 
not follow, contrary to what Atherton and Schwartz claim, 
that if it is false that humans come into the world 
equipped with a natural language, then it is false that 
they will develop one without a rich linguistic experience. 
Thus, their objection to the "maturation" characterization 
simply fails. 
Nevertheless, assuming the failure of the "maturation" 
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explication to articulate a plausible tie between lin-
guistic innateness and species-specificity, Atherton 
and Schwartz proceed to review and reject yet a second 
characterization of that connection. According to this, 
view, they claim, the relation between specificity and 
innateness is akin to imprinting in animals: the orga-
nism' s experience triggers an innately programmed species-
specific behavioral response. But though on this view 
experience does play a role in shaping what is acquired 
in behavioral development and thus avoids the commitment 
of the "maturation" formulation that every aspect of 
linguistic behavior must be present at birth, it does so 
only, they insist, in the sense of "filling in some pre-
existing set." More precisely, characteristic of im-
printed behavior is its incorrigibility: once acquired, 
no matter how' inappropriate the object, the behavior is 
fixed. But this degree of incorrigibility, they rightly 
continue, is not characteristic of linguistic behavior. 
Thus, the "imprinting" explication of the alleged rela-
tion between linguistic species-specificity and innate-
ness also fails." 
Though in favor of this objection it must surely be 
granted that the way in which children acquire language 
is in some sense quite flexible, the argument has taken 
the duckling for the duckpond. For no one would imagine 
human linguistic behavior to possess the degree of in-
flexibility in some sense involved in, say, the behavior 
of young mallards. But surely one can hold that some 
features of imprinted behavior, if that is the appropri-
ate articulation of the tie between the innatist thesis 
and species-specificity, admit of degrees. For example, 
while the "parental object" which greylag geese follow 
is rigidly fixed by imprinting early in their lives,'the 
paths through which these birds move to follow the 
"parent" are apparently infinitely variable. Indeed, 
perhaps some purchase on the relation between the species-
specificity and innateness of language might thus be ex-
tracted from the imprinting analogy by allowing the fixed 
part of imprinted behavior to stand for a particular 
natural language the child learns, while allowing varia-
tions in the means by which the organism relates to the 
imprinted object to correspond to the novelty and creativ-
ity in the production of expressions the child manifests 
within that natural language. What the criticism of the 
"imprinting" analogy establishes, then, is not that lan-
guage acquisition is not like imprinting in any interest-
ing sense, but rather, and trivivally, that linguistic 
behavior merely is in some sense not as inflexible as 
part of the imprinted behavior of some species. 
In spite of failing to exhaust the imprinting model 
of its possible promise, Atherton and Schwartz proceed 
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to reject yet a third characterization of the way in 
which linguistic innatism and species-specificity might 
be connected. People have, they claim, argued that the 
slowness with which chimpanzees acquire human language 
suggests that these creatures require something very 
different from what human children need in linguistic 
experience to achieve competence. But though this 
formulation avoids the problematic commitment to the 
"rigidity" of linguistic behavior characteristic of the 
"imprinting" explication, the fact that chimpanzees 
acquire language more slowly than humans does not 
• "entail,"7 Atherton and Schwartz rightly insist, that 
humans do not learn language or that language acquisi-
tion is like imprinting. So long as we take a balanced 
view of language acquisition, they maintain, it would be 
false to say that no learning is involved in such be-
havior. But this means, they then conclude, that if 
innatism is to be an intelligible account of language 
development it must be seen as "part and parcel of some 
• learning theory." 8 So construed, however, the innatist 
thesis is no longer language-specific, and hence cannot 
provide rational grounds for establishing a tie between 
linguistic innateness and species-specificity. 
Even if one concedes with this objection that the 
difficulty with which chimps acquire human language 
does not entail a link between the species-specificity 
and innateness of language, it simply does not follow 
that any plausible formulation of the innatist hy-
pothesis is just part of some learning theory, contrary 
to what Atherton and Schwartz maintain. For it does not 
follow from the claim that learning is somehow involved 
in part in language acquisition that there is no innate 
element in such development. Thus their objection to 
the "facility" characterization of possible relations 
between linguistic species-specificity and innateness 
fails to strike its intended target. 
Assuming, nevertheless, the failure of the "facility" 
characterization to link specificity and innateness, 
Atherton and Schwartz's argument then takes a new and 
much stronger tack. However an adequate theory of the 
relation between linguistic species-specificity and in-
nateness might be formulated, they rightly argue, no 
intelligible connection between the two can be articulated 
unless the innatist theory itself is intelligible. But 
no such formulation, they try to show, exists. For the 
only extant version of the innatist thesis holds that 
innate mental structures provide a "form" of language 
whose presence is felt as a restriction on the types of 
languages that can be learned with ease. Such a claim, 
they counter, is not even testable, and furthermore is 
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shown false by the fact that humans obviously do learn 
artificial languages such as codes, ciphers, logical 
calculi, and so on. Thus, if on the innatist view the 
relation between the innate and learned elements of 
language acquisition implies that humans cannot learn 
artificial languages, the innatist theory itself is 
false, and hence cannot plausibly provide rational 
grounds for rendering the connection between species-
specificity and linguistic innateness intelligible. 9 
Now whatever difficulties this criticism might 
possess, it is clear that any account of language ac-
quisition on which the human use of artificial lan-
guages was impossible, would be too demanding to serious-
ly entertain. Beyond this, however, the "acquirability" 
criticism is cogent only if every innatist theory im-
plies the impossibility of human mastery of artificial 
symbolic systems. Yet the ease of mastery of languages 
can surely admit of degrees. If so, all the innatist 
has to hold to make his claim both interesting and test-
able is that there is a detectable difference between 
the ease with which humans learn natural languages 
having some independently identified universal form and 
the ease with which they learn artificial systems lack-
ing that form. Thus the objection to the "acquirability" 
version of the innatist thesis is too narrow to impugn 
nativism in general. 
Assuming, then, the failure of the "acquirability" 
version of the innatist view, Atherton and Schwartz con-
sider a less demanding formulation which holds that the 
roles the learned and innate elements play in language 
acquisition are to be described in terms of "hypotheses" 
which the language learner "tests" against experience. 
Learning a language is seen as "acquiring a set of 
hypotheses" about the appropriate grammar for the lin-
guistic "evidence" the language learner encounters. 
Since the experience which the learner has underdeter-
mines his choice of "hypotheses," Atherton and Schwartz 
correctly conclude, there must be some innate contribu-
tion to linguistic development. Such a view, though 
free of the restrictions implied by the "acquirability" 
version of the innatist theory, they maintain, is, having 
obviously derived from the jargon of studies in inductive 
logic, metaphorical, and hence, cogent only if the 
metaphor can be clearly articulated in empirical terms. 
But all attempts to date, they claim, to articulate this 
metaphor, even though it seems to contain something 
essentially correct, possess their own difficulties. 
For, stripped of the baggage the metaphor carries from 
the jargon of inductive logic, all that the innatist 
can be asserting, they insist, is that something involved 
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in learning a language is innate. But this does not 
distinguish learning in general from learning a language 
in particular, and hence cannot provide grounds for artic-
ulating any interesting connection between linguistic 
species-specificity and innateness.10 
This criticism poses, in contrast to its predecessors, 
a serious difficulty for the assertion that there is some 
cogent tie between linguistic species-specificity and 
innateness. For it rightly and fairly demands that if 
this connection is to be intelligible, the innatist must 
produce: (1) an empirically testable model of the lan-
guage-specific elements involved in language acquisition; 
and (2) an account of the evidential connection between 
species-specificity and innateness of language in terms 
of this model. Though Atherton and Schwartz claim that 
no such account will be found, I am considerably less 
pessimistic: in the remainder of this essay I would like 
to describe a model I think satisfies their demands. 
The m o d e l . 1 1 Linguists have traditionally recognized 
three elements individually necessary and jointly suf-
ficient for the production and understanding of language: 
a syntactic component, consisting of the grammatical form 
of that which is produced or understood; a semantic com-
ponent, consisting of the meaning of those expressions; 
and a phonological component, consisting of the physically 
identifiable features of their spoken form. Accordingly, 
it will be assumed in this model that an adequate theory 
of linguistic behavior aims at producing ordered triples, 
called linguistic descriptions of sentences whose entries 
are, respectively, the syntactic, semantic, and phonolog-
ical components of those sentences. For the sake o.f con-
vention and parsimony, the elements of the phonological 
and semantic components will be taken to be functional 
images of elements of the syntactic components. The 
syntactic component will be regarded as essentially a 
set of rules which specify the infinite class of formal 
structures assumed to underlie the sentences of the lan-
guage. Such structures will be taken to consist of 
strings of minimally syntactically functioning elements 
[format!ves] specifying the syntactic properties of sen-
tences. To each such string one or more descriptions, 
called structural descriptions, indicating the syntactic 
relations of the elements of the string to each other 
and to the sentence will be assigned. 
The class of syntactic components will be taken to 
consist of two major subparts which will be distinguished 
by the kinds of rules they respectively contain. The 
initial, or phrase-structure subcomponent will contain 
a finite set of rules which operate only on strings of 
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symbols. Each such phrase-structure rule will operate 
on a given string by replacing a single nonnull symbol 
in that string by a fixed nonnull string distinct from, 
and not containing, the initial, rewritten symbol. For 
example, a simple set of phrase structure rules might 
look like 
(1) S e n t e n c e N o u n Phrase+Verb Phrase 
(2) Noun Phrase —» Smith 
(3) Noun P h r a s e o r a n g e + s 
(4) Verb Phrase—> Verb Phrase+Noun Phrase 
(5) Verb Phrase —» hate+s 
Such rules permit the construction of derivations: finite 
sequences of strings of format!ves, beginning with the 
initial sequence of the grammar #Sentence# [where # is 
the symbol for a sentence boundary); each successive line 
will be formed by the application of one rule to one 
symbol in its immediate predecessor. One of the deriva-
tions produced by the above rules, for example, consists 
of the sequence [with boundaries omitted]: [Sentence, 
Noun Phrase+Verb Phrase, Smith+Verb Phrase, Smith+Verb+ 
Noun Phrase, Smith+hate+s+Noun Phrase, Smith+hate+s+ 
orange+s]. It will frequently be convenient to represent 
these derivations in the form of tree diagrams, or P-
markers. With the above sentence and derivation, for 
example, the P-marker shown in Diagram I can be associated: 
Diagram I- Sentence 
Smith hate s orange s 
P-markers formally capture the notions of "grammatical 
category," "part of speech," and "immediate constituent 
structure,*? for in the last line of each derivation each 
substring of symbols s_ is uniquely traceable back to 
some node X in such a fashion that "s is [a member of 
the category, or the immediate constituent] X." For 
example, in (I) Smith is a Noun Phrase; hate+s-frorange-fs 
is a Verb Phrase. Given these conventions, then, the 
range of the phrase structure subcomponent of the syn-
tactic component is a finite set of P-markers, each 
describing the constituency relations among the words 
that compose the sentences met in actual linguistic 
experience. 
The rules of the second part of the syntactic com-
ponent, the so-called transformational subpart, will be 
taken to operate on the P-markers produced by the phrase-
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structure component and derive new P-markers. According-
ly two kinds of P-markers will be distinguished in terms 
of the rules with which they are derived: Those whose 
derivations involve only phrase-structure rules, and 
those which are derivable only with the help of one or 
more transformational rules. The former structural 
descriptions will be called underlying P-markers, and the 
latter, derived P-markers• 
In the idiom of this model, then, two notions can 
be distinguished: observable features of a sentence, 
and unobservable features of a sentence. An unobservable 
feature of a sentence S_ is any feature of S which is 
implied by a description of S's underlying P-markers or 
their phonological or semantic images. Correspondingly, 
an observable feature of a sentence S will be defined as 
any feature of S whichTs implied by S's underlying P-
markers or their phonological or semantic images. 
In terms of these distinctions, then, the innatist 
argument can now be quite sharply formulated. First of 
all, it will be assumed that every non-innatist account 
of language acquisition must explain language learning 
solely in terms of the "explicit" features of a given 
language. More precisely, it will be assumed that non-
innatist theories of acquisition hold that the operations 
involved in language learning must be analyzed strictly 
in terms of correlations between what is required in the 
understanding and production of sentences and information 
explicitly available in the phonetic or orthographic 
representations of those sentences. In terms of the 
above model, this means that one of the fundamental assump-
tions of any "associative" theory of linguistic behavior 
is that what is acquired in language learning may be-re-
garded as at best analyzable into elements each of which 
have been associated with observable constituents of 
sentences in the language. If it could be shown that for 
certain semantic or syntactic elements in some sentences 
there are no observable features with which these essential 
elements could be associated, it would have been shown that 
the information available to a language learner is too 
impoversihed for appropriate linguistic behavior to have 
been derived by associative operations alone. 
It will now be argued, accordingly, through a series 
of examples, that the observable features of sentences 
do not, and could not adequately specify all syntactic 
and semantic information necessary for the production 
and understanding of sentences. In terms of the above -
model, this task is equivalent to showing that the phrase-
structure part of the class of syntactic components of 
linguistic descriptions and their semantic and phonolog-
ical images are inadequate to capture what is involved 
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in understanding or producing sentences of some natural 
language. For the sake of brevity in these examples let 
us call a restriction of a realization of the above model 
to its phrase-structure subpart and its corresponding 
semantic and phonological images, a context-free phrase-
structure grammar, or CFPSG, for short. 
Now first of all, it can easily be shown that CFPSG's 
cannot capture ordinary English conjunctions. Consider, 
for example 
(1) Leibnitz and Locke argued through the night. 
To handle (1) a CFPSG will have to contain rules like 
(2) NP —> NP (and) NP 
where "NP stands for the linguistic category "noun 
phrase." Though rules like (2) can generate conjunctions 
of any length, they cannot articulate structural descrip-
tions of all conjunctions correctly; for example, consider 
(3) Leibnitz, Locke, and Lakoff argued through the 
In (3), the three proper nouns in the subject are parallel, 
i.e., the correct structural description of (3) should 
contain a branch which looks like 
But if (2) is the only rule handling conjunctions, the 
only configurations assignable to the subject of (3) 
will look like 
night. 
(4) 
Leibnitz Locke Lakoff 
(5) 
NP 
Leibnitz Locke (and) Lakoff 
or 
(6) 
.NP 
Leibnitz, Locke, and Lakoff 
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which respectively correspond to the sentences 
(7) Leibnitz argued through the night and Locke 
and Lakoff argued through the night. 
(7') Leibnitiz and Locke argued through the night 
and Lakoff argued through the night. 
But obviously (7) and (7') are not renderings of (3). 
The correct structural description of (3) could be 
obtained if the following rule were available 
(8) NP-»NP, NP, (and) NP. 
unfortunately, there is no limit to the number of noun 
phrases that can be conjoined in such constructions and 
hence a CFPSG adequate to English would have to contain 
an infinite number of rules to generate them with the 
right structural descriptions. But by definition, no 
CFPSG can contain more than a finite number of rewriting 
rules. 
There is yet a second difficulty for constructing 
a CFPSG for English. In certain constructions, repetition 
of phrases occurring previously in a sentence are re-
quired. For example, 
(12) Ford fell down, and Nixon fell down, too. 
is grammatical, but 
(13) Ford fell down, and Nixon visited China, too. 
is not. With such "and ... too" constructions, the verb 
phrase of the second independent clause must match that 
of the first independent clause. Such "context-sensitive" 
repetitions, Chomsky has formally shown,12 cannot be 
captured by any CFPSG. If English has a PSG, then, it 
must in some sense be "context-sensitive;" Accordingly, 
we may introduce the notion of a "context-sensitive 
phrase-structure grammar (CSPSG).'* A CSPSG is a CFPSG 
together with a collection of context-sensitive phrase-
structure rules which in some manner allow one to replace 
a given nonnull symbol in a string with a phrase contain-
ing a possibly variable number of elements. As above, it 
will be assumed that only the words actually occurring 
in a given sentence and the names of linguistic categories 
can appear at the nodes of context-sensitive phrase-
structure P-markers of that sentence; furthermore, it 
will be assumed as before that there is a one-one cor-
respondence between the sentences of a language and the 
structural descriptions of that language. 
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To the above argument, then, a .clever associationist 
(if there are any) might object that the examples consid-
ered so far are exceptional, and that a CFPSG together 
with a few additional context-sensitive rules to cover 
these exceptions could handle the language. 
But though there seems to be some prima facie merit 
to such a suggestion, it will now be argued that the ex-
ceptions are really too common, if not ubiquitous, tb 
sustain such hopes. Consider the following example 
(here and wherever appropriate throughout the remainder 
of the essay, entries on the left will be regarded as 
grammatical; entries on the right will be taken to be 
grammatically deficient in a way intended to illustrate 
the immediate point under discussion): 
(14) I am falling I are falling 
he is falling he am falling 
you are falling you is falling 
Ford is falling Ford are falling 
The skiers are 
falling The skiers is falling 
Obviously, in these examples there is a dependency be-
tween object and certain features of the verb phrase 
[here, the auxiliary]. The clever associationist might 
therefore conjecture that these examples could be handled 
by rules that derive the verb phrase in a way which de-
pends on the subject noun phrase. Crudely formulated 
such rules might look like 
(14 a) S—>NP+VP 
NP —» D+N 
N P — > D N s (where "s" is the plural) 
sVP —» S are V ing 
N+VP—>N is V ing 
Such rules will at least allow the distinction required 
between singular and plural common nouns. A separate 
set of rules would be required to handle pronouns, how-
ever. And even further rules are needed, because various 
constructions can obviously be inserted between the NP's 
and VP's; in 
(15) Ford is probably falling " are falling 
. The man from the White 
House is falling " are falling 
The man the reporter saw 
is falling " are falling 
for example, each different kind of material inserted 
between subject and verb requires a distinct phrase-
structure rule. 
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An analogous problem is illustrated by the case of 
questions: 
(16) Am I falling? are ... 
Are you falling? am ... 
Is he falling? are ... 
Are they falling? am ... 
Are the skiers 
falling? is ... 
Is Ford falling? are ,.. 
Here, the same sort of subject-verb dependency obtains 
as in (14), except that the relation is between the 
subject noun and the first element in the sentence. 
Since permutational rules are excluded from PSG's, there 
is no way to use rules like (14a) to derive both (14) and 
(16). Similarly, sentences containing negatives, nega-
tive questions, and commands have such "shared constraints" 
and a distinct phrase-structure rule would have to be 
introduced for each such genera and each distinct kind 
of intervening material within sentences in those genera. 
Moreover, English and several other Indo-European 
languages contain what may be called "distant dependen-
cies." Consider for example 
(17) They pulled Ford out of the drift what he 
3truck. 
They pulled Ford out of the drift that he 
struck. 
They helped the man in the drift what he 
struck. 
They helped the man in the drift that he 
struck. 
Here, an element at one point in a sentence determines 
the nature of another at a considerable distance. Again, 
as above, a distinct kind of rule for each distinct kind 
of intervening material would be needed. 
Similarly, consider 
(18) Ford got the impression that Mother Nature 
intended to leave. 
Ford got the impression which Mother Nature 
intended to leave. 
Ford got the impression which Mother Nature 
intended to leave him. 
Ford got the impression that Mother Nature 
intended to leave him. 
In these examples, "which" is acceptable only if the 
clause which follows it can be interpreted as a relative 
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clause rather than as a complement. If the sentence 
which follows is a relative clause, however, "that" is 
still acceptable, and in some cases, this produces some 
interesting ambiguities: 
(19) Ford left the impression that he hadn't in-
tended to leave. 
Often enough, it may not become clear that the clause 
following "impression" in (19) is relative until the end 
of the sentence. Thus if we add "a quarter" to the end 
of (19) we interpret the final clause as relative. And 
as above, for each such distinct kind of sentence, a 
distinct phrase-structure rule will be required. 
The above examples at best show that a CSPSG is not 
likely to capture all distant dependencies in the sen-
tences of English. Stronger arguments are therefore 
required to show that no such grammar can capture all 
information necessary for the production and understand-
ing of sentences. 
Consider, then, 
(20) Ortcutt is eager to kill 
(21) Ortcutt is easy to kill 
The underlying P-markers of (20) and (21) are, respective-
ly 
(22) Sentence (23) Sentence 
7 
Ortcutt is eager 
Thus there is no plausible grammatical difference between 
(20) and (21) that can be represented in terms of their 
underlying P-markers. But obviously, in (20) "Ortcutt" 
is the subject of "to kill" while in (21) "Ortcutt" is 
the object of "to kill." Thus a phrase-structure descrip-
tion of these two sentences does not contain information 
sufficient for their understanding or production. This 
implies, of course, that the observable features of (20) 
and (21) are too impoverished to distinguish the syntax 
of these sentences. 
Similarly, consider 
(24) Harbor Ortcutt 
whose only underlying P-marker is 
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sTnoe 
VP 
Harbor^Ortcutt 
Since understanding (24) requires that the language 
learner know that "you" is contained in adequate syntactic 
and semantic representation of that sentence, phrase-
structure grammars once again fail to capture information 
necessary to the production and understanding of sentences. 
Finally, consider the following sort of sentence, 
which is structurally ambiguous though it contains no 
ambiguous words 
This is the only underlying P-marker which can be reason-
ably assigned to "fleeing armed spies can be dangerous," 
yet (26) clearly has two distinct menaings. Thus, once 
again, PSG's are an inadequate representation of natural 
language. 
Examples like (21)-(26) show, then, that PSG's_ 
cannot capture information essential to the production 
and understanding of natural languages. From this it 
follows that associationist theories of language acqui-
sition are inadequate, and, on the assumption that the 
only plausible theories other than the associationist 
are innatist, that innatist theories are the only viable 
explanations of such linguistic phenomena. 
It might be objected to this view, however, that the 
associationist theories of language can account for such 
unobservable features aa the suppressed "you" subject of 
imperatives because certain imperativescontain the word. 
In particular, it could be plausibly held that the lan-
guage learner can and does correlate imperatives ex-
plicitly containing "you" with those not explicitly 
containing it. 
But this proposal is extremely problematic. For 
not only do such sentences as 
(27) You harbor Ortcutt 
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occur in the language learner's experience, but also such 
sentences as 
(2 8) Bernard harbors Ortcutt 
(29) No one harbors Ortcutt 
occur. Now if the associationist theories are to explain 
how the appropriate correlation between instances of 
suppressed and explicit occurrences of the imperative's 
subject are to be reached, the language learner's 
association must proceed from sentences like (27) . But 
on the associationist account, there is nothing in the 
language learner's acguisitional "equipment" to prevent 
the learner from erroneously correlating (24) with (28) 
or (29) . In contrast, the model posited by the innatist 
holds that there is a transformational relation between 
(24) and (27) which does not hold between (24) and (28) 
or between (24) and (29). 
Similarly, the associationist might argue that cases 
like (20) and (21) are correlated, respectively, with 
sentences like 
(30) Ortcutt is eager for Ortcutt to kill 
(31) It is easy for one to kill Ortcutt 
But if the reasons for this pair of correlations as dis-
tinguished from some other is that (20) and (30) have the 
same meaning and (21) and (31) have the same meaning, 
then the associationist has to show how the language 
learner can recognize the "Ortcutt" is the object of "to 
kill" in (31), but the subject of "to kill" in (30) . It 
is not sufficient to observe that in (31) "Ortcutt" 
follows "to kill" whereas in (30) "Ortcutt" precedes "to 
kill," since in the observable form of indefinitely many 
sentences the order of subject and object can be reversed. 
For example, in 
(32) The dagger was concealed by Ortcutt 
the subject "Ortcutt" follows the verb. What the asso-
ciationist requires, but does not have, is a general 
notion of subject'of and object of which are formulated 
in terms of configurations of syntactic symbols in de-
rived P-markers and the notions of transformations which 
connect these P-markers with the appropriate final de-
rived P-markers. 
These arguments and examples go far to sharpen the 
innatist's theory and methodology. For if the assumption 
that associationism is the only plausible theory of lan-
guage acquisition other than the innatist is correct, 
then in general the innatist may hold that that is innate 
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which cannot be accounted for on associationist principles. 
This formulation, cast in terms of the model outlined 
above, I believe is sufficiently language-specific and 
purged of inductivist metaphors to overcome the charge of 
vagueness forward by Atherton and Schwartz. And, so 
formulated, the innatist theory is empirically testable 
because the actual sentences of natural language are axiomat 
ically tied to the model by derivations. 
.The remaining challenge, to produce a plausible 
connection between species-specificity and linguistic 
innateness in terms of this model can now be fairly direct-
ly met. Though it must surely be conceded, as Atherton 
and Schwartz insist, that there is no immediate logical 
dependence between linguistic innatism and the alleged 
species-specificity of language, it likewise must be 
conceded that this does not imply that there is not some 
evidential link between the two. For, certeris paribus, 
the failure or success of non-humans to master human 
language provides evidential evaluation of the claim 
that there is a uniquely human language-specific faculty 
of the sort described in the above model. And if it is 
assumed that linguistic behavior is genetically determined, 
and that what is genetically determined is innate, then 
the failure or success, ceteris paribus, of creatures 
genetically distinct from Homo sapiens to master human 
language provides evidential grounds for assessing the 
claim that this allegedly species-specific faculty is 
innate. 
The problem here, of course, is how to articulate 
the paribus condition. Though by no means trivial, the 
difficulty is considerably mitigated by the model and 
methodology outlined above. For at the very least, the 
model provides a means of identifying the language-
specific, putatively innate elements in linguistic behav-
ior, showing thereby just what variables are and are not 
part of that condition. So construed, the problem of 
assessing the import of the linguistic performance of non-
humans thus reduces to the task of formulating and 
evaluating an adequate nonlinguistic interspecific 
learning theory. With the theoretical and methodological 
burden of such investigations thus shifted to non-
linguistic concerns, we should in principle and time 
come to see the significance to the species of Sarah's 
first signs. 
Indiana University 
Bloomington 
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